In several countries, including England and the Netherlands, competition among healthcare providers is used as an instrument for improving efficiency.[^1^](#fwz036-FN1){ref-type="fn"} The enforcement of competition rules to prevent the creation, strengthening, and abuse of dominant positions is then crucially important.[^2^](#fwz036-FN2){ref-type="fn"} As in any sector, in healthcare consumers can only benefit from competition in terms of lower prices, higher quality, more choice, and increased innovation when markets function properly. This, however, does not come naturally because it is typically not in the interest of sellers to preserve competition. Sometimes firms try to limit competition to increase their profits at the expense of consumers. Therefore, a set of rules is needed to guarantee fair competition. This set of rules aimed at preventing and, when relevant, correcting anticompetitive behaviour, is referred to as competition regulation or competition policy.

Overall, three important general rules apply to firms in competitive markets: they may not engage in anticompetitive agreements, may not abuse a dominant position, and need permission if they want to merge. It is sometimes questioned whether these general rules for fair competition should be enforced in healthcare, as in any other industry, because markets for healthcare have unique attributes.[^3^](#fwz036-FN3){ref-type="fn"} But does the presence of these unique attributes matter for competition policy? From my economic perspective, the answer is 'no, it does not'. Indeed, empirical health economic literature shows that anticompetitive behaviour in healthcare will lead to serious problems,[^4^](#fwz036-FN4){ref-type="fn"} and the US health economist Martin Gaynor has persuasively argued that 'Nothing about the specifics of the health care industry suggests that the unregulated use of market power in this industry is socially beneficial. As a consequence, the antitrust laws should be enforced here as in any other industry.'[^5^](#fwz036-FN5){ref-type="fn"} However, competition policy enforcement in healthcare is, for many reasons, easier said than done. It is precisely because of this that Mary Guy's book is both interesting and useful.

In this book, which has emerged from her doctoral research and subsequent updates, Guy provides a comprehensive and detailed overview, as well as in-depth analysis, of the many issues that are relevant for the application of both general competition law and healthcare-specific competition rules in the Dutch and English healthcare systems. After the introduction---including a general discussion of the fundamental tension between (free) competition and solidarity in healthcare---her book consists of four chapters and a conclusion. In Chapter 1, she offers a detailed examination of the competition reforms in the Netherlands and England and the development of the associated competition policy. Guy explores the latter further in Chapter 2. This chapter starts with an explanation of the EU competition law framework, after which the focus shifts to the emergence of the national competition law frameworks and their application to Dutch and English healthcare cases related to anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominance. It provides the book with a solid theoretical underpinning. In Chapter 3, Guy presents a detailed discussion of the relationship between the general competition authority and the healthcare regulator in the Netherlands and England. As an economist, I found this chapter less interesting, but readers with a background in legal studies will probably appreciate her thorough assessment of the (different implications of the) 'separate' and 'concurrent' powers models. For me, Chapter 4 is the most interesting chapter in the book. It discusses one of the key challenges for competition policy in healthcare: hospital merger control. When discussing consolidation in the US healthcare system, Martin Gaynor and Deborah Haas-Wilson have argued that in a changing environment many mergers 'can be understood as jockeying for position to make sure not to be the one left standing when the music stops, or as an attempt by providers to improve their bargaining positions' vis-à-vis payers.[^6^](#fwz036-FN6){ref-type="fn"} Several lessons can be derived from the years of experience in the USA with hospital merger enforcement,[^7^](#fwz036-FN7){ref-type="fn"} some of which are, despite differences in the legal context, also relevant for the Netherlands and England. These are in addition to the lessons which can be learnt from the two-country comparison in this book.

Guy's comparison of the Dutch and English experiences with the application of general merger control to hospital mergers is interesting because this part of competition policy in both countries seems to be moving in opposite directions. In the Netherlands, the first prohibition on a hospital merger in 2015 stopped a series of (very) doubtful clearances. Because of the Dutch competition authority's permissive approach in the past, regional hospital markets in the Netherlands have become highly concentrated. It is therefore questionable whether insurers have sufficient countervailing buyer power to prevent hospitals from charging high prices and to effectively encourage them to improve quality. Hence, the now stricter approach to hospital mergers by the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) may be too little too late.[^8^](#fwz036-FN8){ref-type="fn"} In England, in 2013 the Competition Commission blocked the first hospital merger reviewed under the Health and Social Care Act 2012. This prohibition, however, was followed by a number of clearances reflecting the opinion of the Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) that, at present, there is only a limited role for competition in the English NHS.[^9^](#fwz036-FN9){ref-type="fn"} This seems to contrast with recent empirical research showing that in England patients are more likely to choose higher quality hospitals, although it seems that (potential) competition is restricted to a few neighbouring hospitals.[^10^](#fwz036-FN10){ref-type="fn"} In a recent paper, Carol Propper, after discussing 25 years of UK healthcare reforms, concludes that the pro-competitive policies have broadly had positive effects:

"Patients and hospitals have responded in a manner that suggests patients care about quality and hospitals, in turn, respond to demand. Better hospitals have attracted more patients, the quality of some services has risen, there do not appear to have been large equity issues, and policies that pursue the alternative tack of consolidation have not brought benefits in the medium term. Hospital consolidation, on the other hand, has not been documented to show large gains.[^11^](#fwz036-FN11){ref-type="fn"}"

In my opinion, this highlights the importance of strict hospital merger control. Once markets have consolidated, it is difficult---if not impossible---to restructure a sector such that issues arising from merged hospitals' market power are adequately addressed. Hence, competition authorities' decisions today shape the healthcare landscape of the future.[^12^](#fwz036-FN12){ref-type="fn"}

In Chapter 4 (section 3.1.1.2), Guy discusses the Dutch healthcare-specific merger test in the Netherlands. This test requires that any merger involving healthcare providers must be assessed by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) prior to the general competition test conducted by the ACM. With regard to her discussion, the following needs to be added. First, in 2015 it was proposed that the ACM, rather than the NZa, would implement this test. To date, however, the relevant draft legislation continues to be debated in parliament and has not yet been passed. Secondly, the potential effect of the proposal should not be overestimated. When implemented, the healthcare-specific merger test will still be purely procedural. More specifically, due to the lack of verifiable quality indicators, the content of the mandatory merger effects report is and will not be assessed. Since its introduction in 2014, the NZa has reviewed almost 700 applications from a wide variety of healthcare sectors (including dental care, long-term care, mental healthcare, and hospital care). Of these, very few were not approved but withdrawn during the process.[^13^](#fwz036-FN13){ref-type="fn"} And recently, in September 2019, the NZa for the first time formally blocked a healthcare merger by revoking its initial permission for the proposed takeover of the *IJsselland Hospital* by the much bigger university medical centre, *Erasmus MC*.[^14^](#fwz036-FN14){ref-type="fn"}

In the conclusion of the book, Guy first provides a brief summary of the findings by chapter and then presents some recommendations for future research and policy directions. Since most of these focus on England---including a tentative consideration of the Brexit effect for competition policy and the English NHS---this final part of the book is less interesting for an international audience. This is, however, not true for the following observation:

"\[T\]he emphasis on collaboration and cooperation between healthcare providers in both countries suggests that there is a need for the competition authorities and regulators to continue to develop guidance about how they will interpret the prohibition on anticompetitive agreements and the interaction between this and merger control. (p 229)"

Across countries, increased efforts are being made to improve the quality of healthcare through the integration and coordination of care, and the use of minimum volume standards for complex surgeries.[^15^](#fwz036-FN15){ref-type="fn"} These efforts pose an important challenge for competition policy in healthcare. Competition authorities often have to make a trade-off between the benefits of these efforts and their potential anticompetitive effects. Collaborating healthcare providers may, for example, deliver the right care to the right patient at the right time but at the wrong price. Or, as another example, the use of minimum volume standards for complex surgeries may lead to increased quality, but this gain may be erased by the reduction in hospital competition associated with concentration.[^16^](#fwz036-FN16){ref-type="fn"} For competition authorities, the key challenge in this context is to assess *a priori* as good as possible when competition and integration in healthcare are optimally balanced.[^17^](#fwz036-FN17){ref-type="fn"}

In the Netherlands, the ACM's positive informal opinion given to three hospitals in the Utrecht region mentioned in Chapter 2 (section 4.2.1.3) is, indeed, illustrative of the potential for trade-offs between competition and regulation. These hospitals argued that close collaboration was inevitable in order to meet the minimum volume standards for some types of complex cancer surgery. In response to the hospitals' self-assessment, the Dutch competition authority argued that the positive effects of the collaboration were likely to outweigh anticompetitive effects such as reduced freedom of choice and potential price increases. Another important point for informal approval was the broad support for the collaboration expressed by both the relevant health insurers in the region and the hospitals' client councils. In addition to the examples mentioned by Guy, it is worth noting here that following the broadly supported report *The Right Care in the Right Place*,[^18^](#fwz036-FN18){ref-type="fn"} the Dutch competition authority in July 2019 (after the publication of this book) issued a draft policy rule explaining that it will not impose any fines for arrangements regarding relocating healthcare delivery if such arrangements meet certain criteria. These can be summarised as follows: the arrangements should be based on a plan regarding the available healthcare capacity in a particular region, that plan should be drawn up in an objective manner and made public, and patient organisations must be fully involved. According to the ACM, it is then safeguarded that a collaboration agreement positively contributes to the accessibility, quality, and affordability of healthcare.[^19^](#fwz036-FN19){ref-type="fn"} With the proposed policy rule, the competition authority is breaking new ground and its (seemingly permissive) approach deserves to be closely monitored and assessed.[^20^](#fwz036-FN20){ref-type="fn"}

To conclude, thanks to her Dutch language skills Guy's book offers a unique and impressive combination of cases and legislation---illustrated by the 12-page (!) list in the beginning---from the Netherlands and England. Combined with its solid theoretical underpinning, the book is undoubtedly a welcome contribution to a body of literature dominated by publications from the context of the US healthcare system. As a non-UK reader, the detailed discussions of successive healthcare NHS reforms were sometimes overwhelming, but the book is interesting and informative. I would highly recommend it to Dutch as well as English healthcare policymakers and regulators, and to those in other countries aiming to introduce or strengthen competition in healthcare.
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